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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN D. O'CORNELL and ANN BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
O'CONNELL, /CROSS-APPELLANTS 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants, : 
v. : Case Mo. 970361-CA 
BLUE CROSS AMD BLUE SHIELD : Priority No. 15 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant and 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees/cross-appellants, hereinafter "O'Connells", 
agree with the appellant's statement as to jurisdiction 
Brief of Appellant at 1, with the addition that the August 8, 
1997, Order of this Court also indicated that the O'Connells' 
cross-appeal was properly before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AMD STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Issues on Appeal and Cross-Appeal 
The issues involved in the appeal and the cross appeal 
are essentially the same and the discussion throughout this 
brief applies to both the appeal and cross-appeal except 
where noted in Subsections 2 and 3 of Point II and in Point 
III of the Details of the Argument. Those issues are: 
1. To which arbitration language, contained in the 
various documents relied upon by Blue Cross/Blue Shield of 
Utah ("BCBSU"), did the O'Connells agree in writing. 
This issue was raised by the O'Connells throughout the 
exchange of memoranda below. See R-5-7, R-113-114, R-123-
125# R-225-227. 
2. Did the district court correctly interpret the 
language of the arbitration agreement in determining which 
disputes, if any, were subject to arbitration, and which 
disputes, if any, were not. 
The issue as to the scope of the disputes covered by the 
arbitration agreement was raised by both parties throughout 
the exchange of memoranda below and was particularly 
addressed by the O'Connells at R-121-122, 124, R-194-195, R-
229. The issue as to whether the O'Connells in that 
agreement unequivocally waived their constitutional rights 
to legal remedies and access to the courts was raised at R-
46, 50-52, 115. 
3. Should The District Court be Directed to Award a 
Reasonable Attorney's Fee for the District Court Proceedings 
and This Appeal. 
This issue was not raised in the district court or in 
this Court until the Conclusion of BCBSU's Brief of 
Appellant. 
B. Standards of Review 
Factual findings underlying arbitration issues are 
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reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, Buzas Baseball 
v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1996), while 
interpretation of the arbitration agreement language is a 
legal conclusion which is reviewed without deference to the 
trial judge's interpretation. Ibid.: pocutel Olivetti 
Corporation v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc.. 731 P.2d 475, 479 
(Utah 1986). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Article I of the Constitution of Utah provides in 
relevant part: 
Sec. 11 [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
The Utah Arbitration Act, as published in the Utah Code 
Annotated/ provides in relevant parts: 
78-31a-3. 
A written agreement to submit any existing or 
future controversy to arbitration is valid, 
enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds 
existing at law or equity to set aside the 
agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided in 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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78-31a-4. 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party 
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, 
shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue 
is raised concerning the existence of an 
arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters 
covered by the agreement, the court shall 
determine those issues and order or deny 
arbitration accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under 
the alleged arbitration agreement is involved in 
an action or proceeding pending before a court 
having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel 
arbitration, the motion shall be made to that 
court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a 
court with proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to 
arbitration stays any action or proceeding 
involving an issue subject to arbitration under 
the agreement. However, if the issue is severable 
from the other issues in the action or proceeding, 
only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. 
If a motion is made in an action or proceeding, 
the order for arbitration shall include a stay of 
the action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate 
may not be grounded on a claim that an issue 
subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault 
or grounds for the claim have not been shown. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal and cross-appeal of a series of orders 
that ultimately granted in part and denied in part the 
defendant BCBSU#s motion to compel arbitration of the issues 
raised by the O'Connells' Complaint. The O'Connells brought 
this legal action seeking equitable relief and damages 
because BCBSU canceled their long-standing group health 
4 
insurance for reasons of health. Their complaint alleged 
that BCBSU breached the applicable subscriber agreement and 
a another, separate and specific, oral and written agreement 
and violated a constructive duty of fair dealing. In the 
alternative, the O'Connells' complaint sought equitable 
relief and damages because the individual conversion policy, 
provided by BCBSU to the O'Connells upon termination of the 
group policy, failed to conform to the requirements of the 
terminated subscriber agreement and the premiums BCBSU 
demanded were based upon the O'Connells' health history in 
violation of the state insurance statutes. R-l-8. 
B. course of the Proceedings 
The defendant, BCBSU, responded to the O'Connells' 
Summons and Complaint by bringing a motion to compel 
arbitration. R-9-11. During the protracted exchange of 
memoranda on the motion (R-12-180), BCBSU asserted that the 
O'Connells had agreed to arbitrate all their claims and at 
various stages proposed a number of different documents as 
evidence of that agreement, upon some of which BCBSU at this 
point no longer appears to be relying. The 0/Connells in 
their memoranda, supported by affidavits, disputed that they 
had read or even received some of these documents or that 
BCBSU was bound by others and alleged that the arbitration 
agreement contained within the "Application" which Ann 
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0/Connell signed in 1993 should not be construed to cover the 
various causes of action asserted in their Complaint. R-46-
61; 112-126; 127-134. BCBSU ultimately supported some of its 
factual claims with affidavits attached to Defendants Reply 
to Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition. R-172-
177. 
After hearing the oral arguments of the parties, the 
district court entered the Court's Ruling of October 8, 1996, 
granting BCBSU's motion to compel arbitration. R-183-191. 
(Addendum A) . The district court at that time found that the 
O'Connells were not bound by arbitration language that was 
contained within an endorsement, that BCBSU claimed it had 
sent to all subscribers in 1986, because there was nothing in 
the record showing that the O'Connell's had read or even 
received it and a unilateral pronouncement by one of the 
parties could not constitute an agreement to arbitrate. R-
186. (Addendum, A-4). However, the district court did find 
that the O'Connells had agreed to arbitrate because of the 
"clearly worded and unambiguous" arbitration language 
contained within the "Application" signed by Ann O'Connell in 
September 1993. Ibid. (That "Application" is attached in 
Addendum D). The district court further found that, because 
BCBSU had rejected a later "Application" that was signed by 
John O'Connell, the arbitration language in that document 
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could not constitute a mutual agreement to arbitrate. R-187 
(Addendum, A-5). The district court stated that it did not 
reach the issue of whether the Subscriber Certificate, that 
BCSCU claimed it sent to the O'Connells, Malso provided 
plaintiffs with additional notice of BCSCU's arbitration 
policy." Ibid. 
The O'Connells thereafter timely moved to amend or 
clarify the Court's Ruling of October 8, 1996. Following a 
further exchange of memoranda, the district court issued its 
Court's Ruling of December 18, 1997, in which it found that 
the arbitration language in the "Application11, to which the 
court had found the O'Connells agreed, "does not extend to 
any existing controversy, it is specifically limited to 
matters 'concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable 
under the subscriber agreement.'" R-206 (Addendum, B-3). 
The court further found that one of the O'Connell's 
alternative claims—the claim that the individual conversion 
policy, that BCBSU furnished to the O'Connells upon 
termination of their group coverage, did not conform to the 
insurance statutes—was not within the scope of the terms of 
the agreement to arbitrate. Ibid. Therefore, the court, 
pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act, Section 78-31a-4(3), 
severed the statutory compliance issue from those to be 
arb itrated. Ibid. 
BCBSU timely filed a motion to reconsider and a 
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supporting memorandum in which it once again invoked the 
broader arbitration language contained within the Subscriber 
Certificate, in addition to that within the "Application11 
signed by Ann O'Connell, and requested that the court order 
all issues in the litigation be arbitrated. R-210-211. 
C. Disposition in the Court Bftlov 
In the Court's Ruling of April 8, 1997, the district 
court's ruling on BCBSU's motion to reconsider and its final 
ruling on the motion to compel arbitration, that court "once 
again" found "that the application signed by the plaintiff, 
Ann O'Connell, does not provide for arbitration of the 
plaintiff's independently arising statutory rights pursuant 
to Utah Code Section 31A-22-701-718." The court stated 
further: 
Furthermore, the Court would clarify that its 
decision to sever the instant matter from 
arbitration does not stem from a lack of faith in 
the merits of arbitration, or any hesitancy to 
have an arbitrator hear matters involving 
statutory interpretation. Rather, the Court's 
decision is based on its belief that it is not 
appropriate to arbitrate an issue concerning an 
independently arising statutory right which was 
not addressed by the arbitration provision 
contained within the defendant's insurance 
application. 
R-249 (Addendum C-2). The court ordered BCBSU to "file an 
Answer within ten (10) days addressing those issues in the 
plaintiff's Complaint concerning statutory claims they might 
have under Utah Code, Section 31A-22-701-718." The district 
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court, citing Section 78-31a-4(3) of the Utah Arbitration 
Act, stayed the arbitration, rather than the litigation, as 
to the other issues. Ibid.J 
D. Relevant Facts 
In order to determine which of the disputes involved in 
this litigation, if any, the O'Connells agreed to arbitrate, 
it is necessary to understand the sequence of events, the 
nature of the O'Connells' claims and their factual and legal 
underpinnings, and the various documents claimed by BCBSU to 
constitute the "written agreement" by the O'Connells to 
arbitrate each of those claims. 
The O'Connells have continuously carried health 
insurance provided by BCBSU for over twenty years and, 
perhaps, for as long as twenty-seven years, and paid many 
thousands of dollars in premiums to BCBSU.2 R-l. A critical 
lfThe O'Connells had informed the trial court that the proper procedure under the statute, 
Sec. 78-31a-4(3), where issues have severed, is to stay the court proceedings as to the matters 
to be arbitrated and order the defendant to answer the complaint as to the other claims. R-
230, 231. BCBSU, while opposing any severance of the issues, took no position regarding 
whether the arbitration or the litigation should be stayed if the issues were severed. Since 
the statute clearly provides for staying the litigation as to the issues to be arbitrated, the 
O'Connells believe that the trial court simply misspoke itself and inadvertently stayed the 
arbitration instead. BCBSU brought this appeal before the apparent mistake could be brought 
to the trial court's attention. 
^ e O'Connells alleged that they had carried the insurance with BCBSU for over twenty 
years and BCBSU does not appear to dispute that. See App. Br. at 3. The O'Connells 
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condition of that coverage, as it is with any health 
insurance coverage, was BCBSU's agreement not to terminate 
coverage by reason of any condition of the O'Connells' 
health. R-l. Ann O'Connell suffered a serious illness in 
1989 and her medical bills for that year exceeded the 
deductible on the health policy and BCBSU had to actually pay 
money out.3 
Prior to September 1993# the O'Connells had obtained 
their coverage from BCBSU through the Utah State Bar. In 
1993, the O'Connells discussed with BCBSU changing their 
coverage from the Bar group to the Rowland Hall\St. Mark's 
School group because Ann O'Connell was then employed there on 
a year-to-year contract. Because of her 1989 illness, and 
the importance of maintaining continuity of coverage over the 
long-term, Ms. O'Connell sought and obtained oral and written 
assurances from BCBSU that transfers back and forth between 
intended to explore the actual length of the relationship in discovery but believe it began in 
1970 when John O'Connell went into private practice. The O'Connells seek to continue that 
relationship because, like most Americans who are past middle age and not employed by an 
economically powerful entity, they are without any other choice. R-129. 
^ e O'Connells alleged in their complaint that BCBSU effectively terminated their 
insurance for reasons of health in a 1995 letter in which BCBSU based its action upon "your 
claims history and/or your current health" (R-3) but, at that time the O'Connells were unaware 
of whether BCBSU was motivated by Ann O'Connell's health problems in the late ^CXs or 
John O'Connell's health problems in 1994, that also cost BCBSU some money, or perhaps 
both. The O'Connells intended to explore this question in discovery but will accept BCBSU's 
representation in its brief that BCBSU rejected the O'Connells' resubscription in 1995 "based 
on Mrs. O'Connell's medical history." App. Br. at 5. 
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different BCBSU groups would not involve medical underwriting 
and that time in a previous BCBSU group would be credited to 
time in the new group. That is, BCBSU agreed that converting 
from one BCBSU group to another would not constitute becoming 
a new applicant and BCBSU would allow such transfers back and 
forth without regard to health history and without a period 
of exclusion for pre-existing conditions, conditions 
ordinarily imposed upon new applicants for BCBSU's insurance 
coverage. R-2, R-128. It is the violation of this specific 
oral and written agreement, separate and apart from any of 
BCBSU's printed subscriber certificates or health 
agreements,4 which constitutes the basis for the O'Connells' 
primary claim against BCBSU and which the O'Connells believe 
is the furthest outside the scope of any arbitration 
agreement. 
Relying upon the aforementioned assurances by BCBSU and 
following the instructions of BCBSU's agent, Ann O'Connell 
signed and submitted the September 1993 "Application" and 
cancelled the Bar group coverage to effectuate the agreed-
upon transfer of BCBSU's continuing health coverage from the 
Bar group to the Rowland Hall group. R-2, R-127. It is this 
application which contains the arbitration language, in the 
4None of BCBSU's printed documents specifically address the question of whether or not 
subscribers can transfer BCBSU's health coverage between groups, or at least do not do so in 
any understandable form. 
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midst of the finely-printed boiler-plate above the signature, 
that the district court found to constitute the O'Connells' 
written agreement to arbitrate. R-186, R-205-206, R-248. (A 
copy of the "Application" appears in Addendum D.) 
BCBSU claims that it sent to Ann 0'Connell, at some 
unknown time after she submitted the 1973 "Application",5 a 
Subscriber Certificate that BCBSU calls the "Rowland Hall-St. 
Marks Health Agreement" throughout its Brief. 6 The 
5The affidavit submitted by BCBSU does not say when the Type 5E4 certificate was sent-
just that it "was sent to the subscriber after being enrolled for the policy issued through St. 
Mark's Rowland HalT-and it does not say whether BCBSU has a specific record of it being 
sent to the O'Connells or whether the affiant based her conclusion on a general practice. R-
174. The copy of the Type 5E4 certificate, that BCBSU submitted to the district court along 
with the affidavit, has "updated 6-94" hand-written on the cover (R-163) which would make ii 
questionable that it was sent to the O'Connells, if it at all, much before Ann O'Connell's 
employment at Rowland Hall terminated in August, 1994. Ann O'Connell submitted an 
Affidavit in which she stated that the Subscriber Certificate that she had in her file was a 
Type 4M-ML rather than the Type 5E4. R-129. The O'Connells asserted that the 
introduction to the arbitration language in the Type 4M-ML was different from that in the 
Type 5E4 and more consistent with their interpretation of the arbitration language in the 
"Application." R-124-125, see "D Member Grievance Procedure", R-133. 
"The document itself, which BCBSU introduced into the record at R-163 is entitled 
"Subscriber Certificate for Group Medical Benefits, Type 5E4." Considerable confusion is 
caused by BCBSU's habit of inconsistently interchanging the terms: "policy", "subscriber 
certificate", "health agreement"and "subscriber agreement." BCBSU's practice of not placing 
the date and using codes rather than group titles on its documents causes even more serious 
confusion. For example, even if BCBSU had sent the Type 5E4 certificate to the O'Connells, 
there would have been no way the O'Connells could tell by looking at the documents whether 
the Type 5E4 or 4M-4ML was the applicable document for a particular group or period. In 
the district court, BCBSU attempted to explain the system of identifying its documents in a 
employee's affidavit with questionable success. See R-172-175. This encrypted identification 
system of course is of no use to the subscribers. 
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0/Connells stated by Affidavit of Ann O'Connell that she had 
a different version of that subscriber certificate in her 
file and, in any event, had not read either version of the 
subscriber certificate.7 R-129. BCBSU never claimed that Ann 
O'Connell had a subscriber certificate for the Rowland Hall 
group in her possession at the time that she signed the 
"Application11 in September 1993
 #
8
 and there is no evidence 
whatsoever in the record that either of the O'Connells ever 
indicated in writing that they agreed to the arbitration 
terms contained therein. 
Ann O'Connell's employment at Rowland Hall terminated in 
August 1994, but the Rowland Hall group coverage continued 
for a period by operation of federal law. R-3. The 
0/Connells then requested a transfer of their BCBSU coverage 
back to the State Bar group. BCBSU had John O'Connell 
submit another HApplicationM which it subjected to medical 
underwriting and rejected for medical history reasons in 
breach of the specific promises it made when it induced the 
O'Connells to leave the Bar group in September 1993, and 
despite the fact that the medical history it found 
unacceptable apparently occurred while the O'Connells were 
7See note 5, supra. 
8BCBSU claims that the Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate (the Rowland Hall Subscriber 
Agreement) "was sent to the subscriber after being enrolled for the policy issued through St 
Mark's Rowland Hall/' R-174. 
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members of the Bar group a number of years before. Thus, 
BCBSU effectively cancelled the O'Connells long-standing, 
continuous health insurance coverage because of a change in 
condition of health which occurred while the O'Connells were 
covered by BCBSU's non-cancelable insurance. 
Because the O'Connells were terminated from the Rowland 
Hall group and BCBSU reneged on its promise to allow them to 
transfer back to the Bar group, and because it is virtually 
impossible to obtain health insurance elsewhere after one has 
been refused coverage for health reasons (R-129), the 
O'Connells were forced, after the filing of this action and 
under protest, to convert their coverage to a BCBSU 
individual policy. In their Complaint, the O'Connells 
alleged that BCBSU agreed, in the Subscriber Certificate for 
the Rowland Hall group, to provide individual coverage upon 
termination of the group coverage without evidence of 
insurability or without conditions pertaining to health at 
9See note 3, supra. BCBSU represents, in the Brief of Appellant at note 2, that due to a 
change in federal law, the O'Connells can now obtain coverage through the Bar group without 
respect to health condition. BCBSU made this same representation to the O'Connells in a 
letter, but when the O'Connells made further inquiry, BCSU's attorney of record replied in a 
letter, dated September 30, 1997: "However the Bar policy now has annual enrollment 
periods, so absent a special enrollment period, vou would not be able to obtain Bar coverage 
until May 16. 1998." (Emphasis added). Even if BCBSU does not change its policy between 
now and May, and the O'Connells do obtain coverage through the Bar, that would not moot 
the cause of action for breach of the agreement to allow the O'Connells to transfer back to the 
Bar group because the O'Connells' claim for foreseeable, consequential damages (R-5, 8), 
would remain. 
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rates reasonably related to age or class of risk other than 
risk due to health condition. R-3-4. The Complaint also 
alleges that the Utah Insurance Code, Sections 31A-22-704 
through 717, mandated such an individual conversion policy 
and prohibited basing the premium of a conversion policy upon 
conditions related to health. Ibid. The O'Connells alleged 
that the conversion policy offered to them (and since 
provided) failed to conform to the subscriber certificate and 
also violated the Utah Insurance Code. The O'Connells sought 
relief for these causes of action in the alternative to the 
relief sought for the refusal to allow the O'Connells to 
transfer back to the Bar group. R-3-4, 6-7. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court found that the O'Connells agreed to 
the narrow arbitration language contained within the 
"Application11 signed by Ann O'Connell in September 1993. 
BCBSU argues that the O'Connells should also be bound by the 
broader language appearing in the Type 5E4 (Rowland Hall) 
Subscriber Certificate. However, there is no indication 
whatsoever in the record that the O'Connells had read that 
document prior to this dispute arising or had ever agreed to 
its contents. 
Utah law favors enforcing arbitration agreements, but 
JL5 
only where the party moving to compel arbitration can show 
that the other party unequivocally waived the constitutional 
rights to legal remedies and access to the courts and agreed 
in writing to arbitrate the dispute in question. BCBSU 
failed to prove that the O'Connells agreed in writing to any 
arbitration language other than the narrow language in the 
"Application11 and the district court's finding on this 
underlying factual issue should not be disturbed. 
The arbitration language in the "Application" was 
contained within an adhesion contract and therefore should be 
interpreted against the insurance company that drafted it and 
as an ordinary purchaser might reasonably understand it. The 
district court correctly interpreted that language to not 
require arbitration of the O'Connells' claim that BCBSU's 
conversion policy failed to conform to the State Insurance 
Code. 
The district court incorrectly interpreted the 
arbitration language, which by its terms applied only to 
disputes between the insureds and the carrier or medical 
providers "concerning the applicability of, or benefits 
payable under the Subscriber Agreement," to cover all the 
rest of the O'Connells claims. That language in context 
might reasonably be understood by an ordinary purchaser of 
insurance to refer to disputes regarding what medical 
procedures are covered by the insurance and the extent to 
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which medical provider's fees would be paid. 
The O'Connells' causes of action that BCBSU breached a 
specific promise, made separately from the subscriber 
agreement, to allow them to transfer between BCBSU groups, 
and violated the long standing guarantee against cancelling 
the insurance for health reasons and the constructive duty of 
fair dealing which arose out of the long-term relationship, 
do not raise disputes "concerning the applicability of, or 
benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement." The 
O'Connells' claims, that BCBSU breached the subscriber 
agreement itself by cancelling their long-standing health 
insurance and failing to provide a comparable individual 
conversion policy at reasonable rates, are not claims that an 
ordinary purchaser might reasonably understand as being 
disputes between the purchaser or medical providers and the 
carrier concerning "the applicability of or benefits payable 
under the Subscriber Agreement." Furthermore, as to all of 
their claims, the arbitration language in the "Application" 
does not unequivocally show that Ann O'Connell waived the 
O'Connells' constitutional rights to their legal remedies and 
access to the courts. 
BCBSU failed to raise its request for attorney's fees 
below. Attorney's fees are discretionary and should not be 
awarded to BCBSU in this instance. 
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DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I: The Only Arbitration Language That The O'Connells 
Could Have Agreed to Was That Contained in The 1993 
"Application." 
The district court found that the O'Connells were bound 
by the relatively narrow arbitration language contained 
within the "Application" signed by Ann 0#Connell in September 
1993. However, BCBSU continues to assert that the O'Connells 
are also bound by the broader arbitration clause contained 
within the Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate (R-162, 165) which 
BCBSU calls the "Rowland Hall-St. Mark's Health Agreement."10 
The O'Connells disputed that they had read this document and 
questioned that they had even received a copy before this 
dispute arose. R-129, 225-226; See note 5, supra. More 
importantly, there is no indication whatsoever in the record 
that the O'Connells ever agreed to the arbitration language 
within this document or had a copy of it in their possession 
at the time Ann O'Connell signed the "Application" in 
September 1993. 
The district court stated, at one point, that it did not 
10See note 6, supra. BCBSU does not challenge, in the Brief of Appellant, the district 
court's rejection of BCBSU's attempts below to rely upon the arbitration language contained 
in other documents as constituting the O'Connells' agreement to arbitrate. 
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reach the issue of whether the Subscriber Certificate also 
provided the O'Connells with additional notice of BCBSU's 
arbitration policy. R-187. However, the district court went 
on to make it clear that it was holding the O'Connells only 
to the more limited language of the "Application." R-187-
188, 206, 248-249 (Addenda A, B & C) . The district court did 
so despite BCBSU's repeated invocation of the broader 
language in the Type 5E4 Certificate. R-139, 143, 210-211. 
The district court did not find that the O'Connells had 
actually received the Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate; nor 
could it have done so based upon the affidavits in the 
record.11 However, even if there were some evidence that the 
O'Connells had received a Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate 
while they were enrolled in the Rowland Hall group, that 
evidence would not compel a factual finding that the 
O'Connells had agreed in writing to the broad arbitration 
language within that document. As the district court 
correctly stated with regard to the language within another 
document that BCBSU claimed it sent to its subscribers in 
11
 The district court at one point stated that the O'Connells were mailed a subscriber 
certificate (R-184), but that court did not make a finding as to what version was sent or when 
it was sent or that it was received by the O'Connells who raised questions as to all those 
matters. See note 5, supra. The O'Connells continued to dispute the fact that they had 
received the Type 5E4 certificate (R-225-226), relying upon Ann O'Connells' previously filed 
Affidavit. R-127, 129. 
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1986: 
Because the record does not reflect whether 
plaintiffs read or even received the 1986 
Endorsement, the Court cannot find that it bound 
them to arbitration. At the very least, some 
written agreement or document of understanding 
must exist between two parties in order to compel 
arbitration. Utah Code Ann. 78-3la-3 (1992). This 
Court finds that the unilateral proclamation or 
amendment mailed by one party to the other in this 
case did not constitute an agreement to arbitrate. 
R-186. 
The Utah Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of a 
"written agreement to submit any existing or future 
controversy to arbitration11. Section 78-31a-3, Utah Code. 
The party making a motion to compel arbitration must show the 
existence of that written agreement. Section 78-31a-4(l), 
Utah Code. The Arbitration Act also provides a mechanism for 
determining the scope of the issues covered by the 
arbitration agreement and for severing those so covered from 
the ones not covered. Section 78-31a-4, Utah Code. 
There is no question but that BCBSU is correct that Utah 
law favors arbitration and provides for enforcement of 
arbitration agreements. Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co. , 
636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981) . However, it is written agreements 
to arbitrate which are freely and mutually entered into 
between the parties, and not unilateral pronouncements of 
just one of the parties, that Utah law enforces. In Lindon 
City, supra at 1073, the Utah Supreme Court quoted with a 
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approval the Washington appellate court in King County v. 
Boeing Co, 570 P.2d 713 (Wash. App. 1977), to the effect that 
arbitration clauses should be construed liberally. BCBSU 
cited to that quotation in its Brief of Appellant at p. 15. 
However, it must be noted that that quotation contains an 
important qualification: 
Arbitration is a contractual remedy for the 
settlement of disputes by extrajudicial means. It 
is a remedy freely bargained for by the parties, 
and "provides a means of giving effect to the 
intention of the parties, easing court congestionf 
and providing a method more expeditious and less 
expensive for the resolution of disputes." There 
is a strong public policy in favor of such a 
remedy, but it should not be invoked to resolve 
disputes that the parties have not agreed to 
arbitrate. 
636 P.2d at 1073. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, in 
Lindon City, supra. also stated: 
Under Article I, Section 11 [access to courts 
and remedy by law] a party may intentionally and 
deliberately waive the ordinary and usual remedy 
to which a party is entitled for the redress of a 
wrong, but such waiver should be expressed in the 
most unequivocal terms. 
636 P.2d at 1074 [Footnotes deleted, bracketed material and 
emphasis added]. 
Thus, it is not simply a question of whether or not 
BCBSU provided the O'Connells with some notice of BCBSU's 
arbitration policy. The party moving to compel arbitration 
must prove that the other party unequivocally waived her 
legal remedies and right to access to the courts and agreed 
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in writing to arbitrate the dispute in question. The 
district court found that the O'Connells agreed to the 
arbitration language in the "Application." However, BCBSU 
simply failed to prove in the district court that the 
O'Connells agreed to the broader arbitration language in the 
Type 5E4 Subscriber Certificate (the version of the "Rowland 
Hall-St. Marks Health Agreement11 replied upon by BCSU in its 
Brief). This is an underlying factual matter rather than a 
question of interpretation. Surely, it was not clearly 
erroneous of the district court to decline to find on this 
record that the O'Connells had agreed to the writing in the 
latter document. 
Point II: The District Court Correctly Interpreted the 
Arbitration Agreement to Mot Apply to the Statutory Claim But 
Incorrectly Interpreted it to Apply to the Other Claims and 
to Constitute a Waiver of Legal Remedies and Access to the 
Courts. 
The arbitration language in the "Application", to which 
the district court found the O'Connells agreed, states: 
I accept Binding Arbitration as the method of 
resolving any disputes arising between me or the 
covered family members and the Plan or a 
participating provider concerning the 
applicability of, or benefits payable under the 
Subscriber Agreement. 
R-162 (Addendum D) . On its face, this language clearly does 
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not constitute an agreement to arbitrate any dispute between 
the parties, nor does it constitute an agreement to arbitrate 
any dispute touching upon or related in any way to the 
subscriber agreement. It is limited in scope to disputes 
between the O'Connells and the Plan (presumably BCBSU) or the 
medical providers "concerning the applicability of, or 
benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement." 
Ann O'Connell in her Affidavit, submitted below (R-127-
128), stated that she would interpret the arbitration 
language in the "Application" to apply to disputes as to 
whether a particular medical bill would be paid and not that 
she would have no recourse to the courts and to a jury if 
BCBSU cancelled the insurance or refused transfer between 
groups for health reasons. She stated further that she would 
not have understood "binding arbitration" to mean that the 
decision of the arbitrator would be final and unreviewable by 
a court even if legally or factually wrong. It is submitted 
that Ann O'Connell's interpretation is the more correct 
interpretation or, at the least, is an interpretation that an 
ordinary purchaser of insurance could reasonably come to in 
the circumstances. It would not be unreasonable for such a 
person to believe that when the application for health care 
insurance spoke of disputes between the patient, the medical 
providers and the health insurance plan "concerning the 
applicability of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber 
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Agreement" it contemplated disputes about such questions as 
what medical procedures were covered by the health plan, what 
doctor's or hospital fees were reasonable, how much of those 
fees are payable by the patient and how to compute the 
deductibles. 
1. Principles of Interpretation 
In Lindon Citv v. Engineers Const. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070 
(1981), the Utah Supreme Court stated that doubts about 
whether a claim is arbitrable should be resolved in favor of 
the parties freedom to contract and quoted the Washington 
Supreme Court to the effect that there is a strong public 
policy in favor of arbitration. 636 P.2d at 1072-1073. 
However, as discussed more fully in Point I, at 20-22, supra, 
that quotation in Lindon Citv specifically made that policy 
in favor of arbitration applicable only to disputes that the 
parties had actually agreed to arbitrate. The Lindon Citv 
decision also stated that waiver of the constitutional rights 
to legal remedy and access to the courts "should be expressed 
in the most unequivocal terms.M 636 P.2d at 1074. 
It is significant that the arbitration language in 
Lindon City was contained within a contract that was drafted 
in its entirety by the City which then refused to arbitrate 
when a dispute arose with a contractor. That is the opposite 
to that which occurred here, where the rather murky 
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arbitration language was placed within the boiler-plate of a 
document that was drafted by BCBSU, the party that is now 
seeking an expansive interpretation of that language. 
In Docutel Olivetti Corporation v. Dick Bradv Systems, 
Inc. . 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court 
reiterated the policy in favor of arbitration, "when the 
parties have agreed not to litigate" citing and quoting 
Lindon City, supra. As in Lindon City, the arbitration 
language involved in Docutel was drafted by the party 
attempting to avoid arbitration and therefore it was a simple 
matter to determine that that party had agreed to resolve the 
dispute by arbitration and had waived access to the courts. 
Furthermore, the Docutel decision held that, even if there 
was ambiguity regarding the scope of disputes covered by the 
arbitration agreement, that ambiguity should be resolved 
against the drafter: 
Docutel drafted the agreement, and we 
interpret ambiguities in it against the drafter. 
Park Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 
918, 920 (Utah 1982). This principle of 
interpretation is particularly appropriate when, 
as here, the ambiguity could have easily been 
avoided. If Docutel had intended to exclude any 
provision from the arbitration clause, it could 
have done so simply by adding the phrase "except 
as provided in paragraph 10" to the arbitration 
clause. 
731 P.2d at 479. In the instant case, BCBSU drafted the 
arbitration agreement and, if it wanted the 0'Connells to 
waive their legal remedies and recourse to the courts and 
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have any future dispute between them and BCBSU submitted to 
private arbitration, it could have simply had the 0#Connells 
sign a statement which clearly and unequivocally so stated. 
While the "Application" for coverage is not itself an 
insurance policy, it should be interpreted under the same 
rules applicable to insurance policies because it was drafted 
by an insurance carrier and was not subject to negotiation 
between the customer and the carrier. Utah law recognizes 
that an insurance contract is a "classic example of an 
adhesion contract" which is prepared by attorneys for the 
company. There is usually no discussion of the terms. The 
terms would not be fully understood by the insured even if 
they were read. And it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis without any bargaining. Therefore, "that 
interpretation is to be placed upon the words of the policy 
which is most favorable to the insured" and they "should be 
strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the 
insured because they are adhesion contracts drafted by the 
insurance companies. . . . Because insurance policies are 
intended for sale to the public, the language of an insurance 
contract must be interpreted and construed as an ordinary 
purchaser of insurance would understand it." U.S. Fidelity 
and Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854 P.2d 519, 521-523 (Utah 1993) 
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(Citing and quoting a long line of Utah cases).12 
In Wheeler v. St. Joseph's Hosp.f 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 
133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977), the California Court of Appeals 
held, in the alternative to a finding of unenforceability 
under that state 's rules concerning conscionability, that the 
arbitration language in an agreement between a patient and a 
hospital was ambiguous and therefore not applicable to a 
malpractice action. The arbitration language there specified 
that it applied to "any legal claim or civil action in 
connection with this hospitalization, by or against hospital 
or its employees or any doctor of medicine . . . " 133 Cal. 
Rptr. at 779, n.2. The court said: 
While to one trained in the law the clause "any 
legal claim or civil action" may fairly and 
reasonably be seen as including medical 
malpractice claims, an ordinary person, even if he 
read the paragraph, might well assume that it only 
related to disputes over hospital bills. 
Ibid, at 790. The court went on to conclude: 
Resolving the ambiguities in favor of the patient, 
the "ARBITRATION OPTION" should not extend to 
malpractice claims against "any doctor of 
medicine" absent some explanation to the patient 
12In Sandt the Utah Supreme Court held that the carrier of an underinsured motorist 
policy could not reduce the amount payable by the amount paid by the responsible party's 
liability insurance carrier in spite of a provision stating: "[T]he limit of liability shall be 
reduced by all sums paid . . . on behalf of persons . . . who may be legally responsible." The 
court found ambiguity was introduced by another provision that states: "[A]ny insurance we 
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible 
insurance." 854 P.2d at 521. 
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at the time he signed the admission form of the 
intended scope to the arbitration provision. The 
evidence is uncontradicted that no such 
explanation was given in the instant case. 
Ibid, at 791. A patient signing an arbitration agreement 
upon entering a hospital might be thinking in terms of 
payment problems rather than a legal action against a doctor 
for negligence. Even more likely, one purchasing health 
insurance would be thinking about disputes about what medical 
expenses the insurance will cover rather than anticipating a 
termination of the health insurance, yet alone, a breach of 
a separate promise or a violation of the Insurance Code by 
the insurance carrier. The arbitration language in the BCBSU 
"Application11 is far narrower than that in Wheeler because, 
by its terms, it does not apply to Many legal claim or civil 
action" but only to disputes "concerning the applicability 
of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement."13 
It is far more reasonable to believe that the latter language 
applied just to disputes concerning what medical procedures 
and expenses were covered by the health policy and whether or 
not they were fully reimbursable than it would be to conclude 
that "any legal claim or civil action" did not include 
malpractice actions. 
13It must be borne in mind that it is undisputed that the CConnells did not have a copy 
the Rowland Hall Subscriber Agreement in their possession at the time that Ann O'Connell 
signed the "Application" so that the contents of the subscriber agreement could only have 
been a matter of speculation for her at that time. 
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Turning now to whether the particular claims made by the 
O'Connells in this litigation raise disputes that are within 
the scope of the arbitration language in the "Application", 
it should be borne in mind that the substantive validity of 
those claims is not now before this Court. The issues here 
are whether Ann O'Connell, by signing that MApplication," 
agreed to arbitrate each of those claims and unequivocally 
waived the O'Connells' constitutional rights to their legal 
remedies and access to the courts. 
2. The Statutory Claim Involved in The Appeal 
The district correct was correct in finding that the 
O'Connells did not agree to arbitrate their claim that the 
conversion policy, furnished to the O'Connells after the 
termination of the Rowland Hall group policy, failed to meet 
the standards required by the Utah Insurance Code. Since 
that claim clearly does not come within the scope of the 
relatively narrower arbitration language within the 
"Application11 because it does not directly concern "the 
applicability of, or benefits payable under the [Rowland Hall 
group] Subscriber Agreement", BCBSU must rely upon the 
broader arbitration language within the terminated Subscriber 
Agreement itself. BCBSU then strains to make the O'Connells' 
statutory claim one concerning the construction, 
interpretation, performance or breach of the Subscriber 
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Agreement in order to bring that claim within the scope of 
the that broader language. BCBSU attempts to do so by 
arguing that, because the Insurance Code requires that group 
insurance policies conform to the code and BCBSU puts the 
terms of its policy in its "Subscriber Agreement/1 any 
attempt to enforce the Code must be an attempt to enforce the 
11
 Subscriber Agreement.M u 
BCBSU's argument fails for two reasons. First, as shown 
in Point I of this brief, the district court did not find 
that the O'Connells had agreed to the broader arbitration 
language in the Subscriber Agreement. Second, it fails 
because the Code imposes a duty to provide a conversion 
policy that meets the Code whether or not the language in 
BCBSU's document describing the policy complies with the 
Code. Surely BCBSU cannot avoid its responsibility under the 
Code by ignoring the Code in drafting its documents. The 
duty to provide a conversion policy that meets the Code 
requirements arises by statute and arises independently of 
the language contained in the Subscriber Agreement itself. 
The O'Connells' right to a conversion policy that conforms to 
the Insurance Code would exist even if BCBSU had put nothing 
14For this rather convoluted argument, BCBSU relies upon Sec. 31A-22-703, reprinted in 
Br. App. at 2, which requires that group insurance policies conform to the requirements of the 
rest of the Insurance Code. The right to a conversion policy at premiums set without regard 
to conditions of health is guaranteed in Sec. 31A-22-704 which in turn was relied upon by the 
O'Connells in their Complaint. R-3. 
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in its Subscriber Agreement concerning a conversion policy. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Rowland Hall Subscriber 
Agreement may also impose a similar duty to provide a 
conversion policy does not make the O'Connells' separate 
claim, that the conversion policy provided by BCBSU does not 
conform to the Code, one for breach of that Subscriber 
Agreement, yet alone a claim concerning Mthe applicability 
of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement." 
BCBSU also argues that because the O'Connells would not 
be entitled to a conversion policy under the Insurance Code 
had they not been previously covered by a group policy, their 
claim "necessarily presupposes" and* "contemplates" the 
existence of a group policy and, therefore a "Subscriber 
Agreement". However, the O'Connells did not agree, by 
signing the "Application", to arbitrate any issue touching 
upon the Subscriber Agreement.15 BCBSU must do more than 
establish some remote nexus between the O'Connells' claim 
and the terminated Subscriber Agreement to remove the claim 
from the purview of the courts. Again, if BCBSU wanted the 
0/Connells to agree to arbitrate any dispute touching upon, 
or which "contemplates" the prior existence of, the 
15Again the test is how an ordinary purchaser of insurance would interpret the arbitration 
language in the "Application" and such a purchaser would be unlikely to be contemplating the 
Insurance Code itself, yet alone, to be compelled to connect that Code to the terminated 
subscriber agreement by the logic of the "ERISA analogy" as suggested by BCBSU. See 
App. Br. at 14. 
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Subscriber Agreement, it could have had the 0/Connells 
subscribe to language that clearly so stated. 
3. The Claims Involved in the Cross-Appeal 
The O'Connells, by way of their cross-appeal, assert 
that the district court erred in interpreting the arbitration 
language of the "Application" to apply to the rest of their 
claims. The O'Connells' primary claim, that BCBSU breached 
its separate oral and written promise to allow the O'Connells 
to transfer back and forth between groups, is clearly not a 
dispute "concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable 
under the Subscriber Agreement." That claim does not even 
touch upon the Rowland Hall Subscriber Agreement. It is 
based upon BCBSU's separate promises, made in telephone 
conversations and confirmed in writing, upon which the 
O'Connells relied when they transferred to the Rowland Hall 
group. Patently, neither the O'Connells request for 
equitable relief nor their claim for consequential damages 
for the anxiety forseeably induced by BCSU's breach of this 
separate agreement are disputes "concerning the applicability 
of, or benefits payments under the Subscriber Agreement."16 
16It is not at all clear whether BCBSU would agree that an arbitrator could award 
consequential damages for breach of an agreement separate from the Subscriber Agreement or 
whether BCBSU would contend that the arbitrator is limited to enforcing the Subscriber 
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Likewise, the 0/Connell/s claims, that BCBSU breached 
its long-standing promise to not terminate the coverage for 
health reasons and the constructive duty of fair dealing 
which arose out of the long term relationship, are not 
disputes "concerning the applicability of, or benefits 
payable under the [Rowland Hall] Subscriber Agreement." 
While it could argued that those claims might "touch upon" 
the Rowland Hall Subscriber Agreement because that agreement 
evidences a small portion of the long-term relationship and 
because that Subscriber Agreement also contained a similar 
guarantee against termination because of health condition, 
those claims nonetheless are not literally claims concerning 
the "applicability of, or benefits payable under the 
Subscriber Agreement." At the very least, those claims are 
not within the interpretation that an ordinary purchaser 
could reasonably place on that arbitration language, that is, 
that it applied only to disputes as to whether particular 
medical procedures are covered and the extent to which 
payments would be made to medical providers. 
More problematic, perhaps, are the O'Connells' claims 
that BCBSU breached the Rowland Hall Subscriber Agreement by 
refusing to allow the transfer, by cancelling the group 
Agreement itself and could only require payment of "benefits payable under the Subscriber 
Agreement" since that is the language used in the arbitration clause in the "Application". 
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coverage for health reasons and by failing to provide a 
reasonably comparable conversion policy, because those claims 
are based directly upon a breach of the terms of the 
Subscriber Agreement itself. Nonetheless, those claims are 
again not disputes that an ordinary purchaser would 
necessarily understand as falling within the arbitration 
language in the "Application11, that is, disputes between the 
patient and the plan or the medical providers "concerning the 
applicability of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber 
Agreement." 
4. Waiver of Constitution Rights as to All Claims 
It is not clear whether BCBSU is claiming that the 
O'Connells have waived altogether any remedy not specifically 
provided in the Subscriber Certificate, such as their claim 
for consequential damages for breach of BCBSU's separate 
promise to allow the 0,Connells to transfer back to the Bar 
group (R-5, 8), or whether BCBSU is merely arguing that all 
such claims should be decided by a private arbitrator.17 In 
either event, a waiver of the constitutional rights to legal 
remedies, access to the courts and jury trial would be 
involved. However, the arbitration language in the 
17See note 16, supra. 
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"Application" utterly fails to meet the separate 
constitutional test of expressing "in the most unequivocal 
terms" that the O'Connells were waiving their rights to 
access to the courts and remedy by law guaranteed by Article 
I, Sections 7 and 11, Constitution of Utah. See, Lindon City 
v. Engineers Const. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Utah 1981). 
The arbitration language, quoted infra at 22, says not one 
word about giving up rights to legal remedies and access to 
court and jury, yet alone expressing that waiver "in the most 
unequivocal terms." It is instructive to compare this 
complete absence of any waiver notice in the fine print 
arbitration language of BCBSU's "Application" with the waiver 
notice which appeared in the very detailed and clear 
arbitration agreement in Sosa v. Paulos. 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 
26, 27 (Sup. Ct. 1996)18: 
NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE 
AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING 
UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL. SEE 
ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT. 
18In Sosa. the Utah Supreme Court adopted the two-stage test for finding an arbitration 
clause unenforceable because of unconscionability. The O'Connells are not now claiming that 
the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is unconscionable. They are saying that 
the language under which Ann O'Connell's signature appears did not contain a waiver of 
rights to legal remedies, access to the courts and jury trial and are suggesting how such a 
waiver might appear in order to be unequivocal. 
35 
It is respectfully submitted that the district court 
should have denied BCBSU#s motion to compel arbitration with 
regard to all of the claims stated in the 0/Connells 
complaint because those claims do not fall with within the 
scope of the arbitration language to which the court found 
the O'Connells agreed and, further, because there was no 
clear and unequivocal waiver by the O'Connells of their 
constitution rights to legal remedy and access to the courts. 
Point III: This Court Should Not Direct the District Court 
to Enter an Award for BCBSU's Attorney's Fee. 
BCBSU asks this Court to direct the trial court to enter 
an award to it for reasonable attorneys' fees for the 
proceedings in the district court and for this appeal. BCBSU 
makes that request for the first time in the Conclusion of 
its Brief of Appellant and does so without citation to the 
record or argument other than a passing citation to Section 
78-31-16 (1997). Since BCBSU did not make a request in the 
district court for attorney's fees in connection with the 
proceedings there, it is precluded from raising that matter 
for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Sukin v.Sukin. 842 
P.2d 922, 926 (Utah App. 1992). 
Furthermore the statute relied upon by BCBSU makes the 
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matter discretionary with the court and the district court 
should have the option of deciding that the equities militate 
against awarding any attorneys' fees to BCBSU.19 Therefore 
even if the matter were timely and properly before this 
Court, the Court should not preclude the district court from 
exercising its discretion in the matter. 
Since BCBSU fails to give any reasons for its requests, 
even for attorneys' fees in this Court, it is difficult for 
the O'Connells to provide counter-arguments. However, it 
should be noted that the O'Connells did not initiate the 
appellate process and that they believe that their arguments 
are sound and, even if they do not prevail, the issues are 
at the least close ones. The question of whether an 
Insurance Carrier may, in the manner that BCBSU has attempted 
to do so, unilaterally exempt itself from having important 
issues, including its statutory obligations, decided publicly 
in the courts is one of first impression in this 
jurisdiction. Awarding attorneys' fees to BCBSU in these 
circumstances will have a chilling effect and discourage 
consumers from attempting to settle legal questions of import 
to the public. 
19The district court might conclude, for example, that an award for attorneys fees is 
inappropriate because BCBSU did not even raise the agreement and argument upon which it 
initially prevailed until its reply memorandum below and made a number of meritless 
arguments and confused the record with irrelevant documents. 
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CONCLUSION 
BCBSU failed to establish that the O'Connells agreed in 
writing to any arbitration language other than the narrow 
language contained in the "Application." The district court 
correctly interpreted that language to exclude the 
0/Connells/ statutory claim but incorrectly interpreted it to 
include the other claims made in the Complaint and to 
constitute a waiver of the O'Connells Constitutional rights 
to legal remedies and access to the courts. Accordingly, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting 
the motion to compel arbitration as to any of the claims. In 
the alternative, this Court should remand with instructions 
to sever the issues that this Court finds should be 
arbitrated from those that it finds should not.20 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of February, 
1998. 
)HN D. 0'CONNELL 
Attorney for Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
20If severance is ordered, the litigation should be stayed as to the matters to be arbitrated 
and arbitration and litigation should both go forward. See note 1, supra. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Court's Ruling, October 8, 1996. R-183 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL AND : COURT'S RULING 
ANN O'CONNELL 
Plaintiffs, Civil No. 960901038CV 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
OF UTAH, a Utah corporation : 
Defendant. : 
This case concerns the plaintiffs' right to rejoin a medical insurance group policy. 
The matter came before the court for hearing on June 13, 1996, on defendant's Motion to 
Compel Arbitration. The Court heard argument on that date and took the matter under 
advisement. After a careful review of the pleadings, facts, law, and consideration of the oral 
argument, the Court grants the defendant's motion to compel arbitration. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The uncontroverted facts set forth in plaintiffs' and defendant's memoranda reflect 
that approximately fifteen years ago, Plaintiff, John O'Connell, began receiving health 
insurance coverage from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah ("BCBSU") through a group policy 
issued to members of the Utah State Bar ("USB"). Neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendant 
have asserted that the initial health care policy include any provision requiring binding 
arbitration of disputes between BCBSU and its subscribers. However, in January of 1986, 
BCBSU modified its health care agreements by mailing its customers an endorsement 
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requiring future disputes between BCBSU and its subscribers to be settled through binding 
arbitration. (Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, at 2). 
In the late Summer of 1993, plaintiff, Ann O'Connell contacted BCBSU and inquired 
about the possibility of changing from the USB group policy to the Rowland Hall St. Mark's 
("RHSM") BCBSU group policy. Based upon a BCBSU's representative's assurances that 
changing group policies within the BCBSU system would not subject the plaintiffs to medical 
underwriting and that they would be credited for their enrollment time under the prior policy, 
plaintiffs cancelled the USB policy and switched to the RHSM group policy. (Complaint, at 
2). 
In order to make the switch to the RHSM group policy, plaintiff, Ann O'Connell, was 
required to fill out an application for membership. While plaintiff, Ann O'Connell, does not 
specifically remember reading nor filling out the application, she does recognize the signature 
on the application as her own. (Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition, at 2). 
After filling out the application, the plaintiffs were mailed a subscription certificate 
containing details of the RHSM policy. Plaintiffs coverage under the RHSM group policy 
started on October 1, 1993, and continues today under an individual conversion policy issued 
by BCBSU. (Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum, at 4). 
In May of 1995, plaintiff, John O'Connell, attempted to switch coverage from the 
RHSM policy back to the USB policy. Plaintiff filled out a new Utah Bar BCBSU 
application but was subsequently denied coverage. Plaintiffs initiated legal action against the 
Defendant on February 12, 1996, alleging a breach of contract and statutory obligations to 
the plaintiffs. On March 4, 1996, defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration with the 
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Court. After receiving several memoranda regarding the motion to compel arbitration, the 
Court set the matter for a hearing on June 13, 1996. At the June 13 hearing the Court heard 
oral arguments from counsel and took the matter under advisement. 
ISSUES; 
L Whether the plaintiffs assented to BCBSU's arbitration policy? 
II. Whether the BCBSU arbitration provision is valid? 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I. PLAINTIFFS ASSENTED TO BCBSU'S ARBITRATION POLICY. 
The plaintiffs contend they never agreed to submit to BCBSU's arbitration policy. On 
the other hand, BCBSU asserts the plaintiffs either clearly assented, or are deemed to have 
assented, to arbitration and are estopped from arguing otherwise. In finding the plaintiffs did 
assent to binding arbitration, the Court has carefully examined each of the following 
documents or transaction between plaintiffs and defendants: 
Plaintiffs Pre-1986 BCBSU Health Care Agreement 
The facts of this case show that between the time plaintiffs first joined the BCBSU 
Bar Group Policy until the January 1986 Endorsement, plaintiffs were not aware of any 
agreement to arbitrate disputes with BCBSU. This is supported by all of the uncontroverted 
facts provided to the Court. 
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The January 1986 Endorsement to BCBSU Health Care Agreements 
The Court finds the 1986 Endorsement to BCBSU Health Care Agreements did not 
constitute plaintiffs' agreement to arbitration. Because the recprd does not reflect whether 
plaintiffs read or even received the 1986 Endorsement, the Court cannot find that it bound 
them to arbitration. At the very least, some written agreement or document of 
understanding, must exist between two parties in order to compel arbitration. Utah Code 
Ann. 78-3la-3 (1992). This Court finds that the unilateral proclamation or amendment 
mailed by one party to the other in this case did not constitute an agreement to arbitrate. 
The September 1993. RHSM Group Application and Subscriber Certificate 
The Court next examines the September 1993, RHSM group application. This one-
page application contains a standard arbitration provision placed directly over the area 
bearing the plaintiff, Ann O'Connell's signature. The Court finds the arbitration provision to 
be clear, plainly worded, and unambiguous. The Court also finds that by signing the 
application the plaintiff assented to BCBSU's arbitration policy. 
Plaintiffs have argued that they should not be subject to arbitration because they did 
not read the subscriber certificates or the applications they signed, and thus did not have 
notice of the arbitration provisions. The Court is not compelled by this argument as it 
relates to the application. The case law is clear that a party has a duty to read and 
understand the terms of a contract before signing it. Hottinger v. Jensen. 684 P.2d 1271, 
1274 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, the arbitration provision was contained within a one-
page application and printed directly above the space bearing plaintiff Ann O'Connell's 
signature. The provision should have been read by the plaintiff and constituted a valid 
A- 4 
fft crp AV) > L ^ 0 
agreement to arbitrate. After their application was accepted the plaintiffs were mailed a
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subscriber certificate containing more detailed information about BCBSU's arbitration policy. J 
Because we find the application constituted a valid agreement to arbitrate, the Court does not 
reach the issue of whether the subscriber certificate also provided plaintiffs with additional 
notice of BCBSU's arbitration policy 
The May 1995. BCBSU Bar Group Application 
The Court finds the May 1995, BCBSU Bar Group Application bearing plaintiff, John 
O'Connell's, signature did not constitute plaintiffs consent to submit to arbitration. Once 
again, the Utah Arbitration Act clearly states that a written agreement must exist in order to 
compel a party to arbitration. Utah Code Ann. 78-31a-3 (1992). Because BCBSU rejected 
the 1995 application which was submitted by the plaintiff there was no mutual assent, and 
thus no agreement to arbitrate. The Court finds that BCBSU is precluded from using the 
provisions of a rejected application as a means of compelling the plaintiffs to binding 
arbitration. 
H. THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN THE 1993 RHSM GROUP POLICY 
APPLICATION IS CLEARLY WORDED, UNAMBIGUOUS, AND THUS 
VALID. 
The Utah Arbitration Act provides: 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration 
is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or 
equity to set aside the agreement . . . 
Utah Code Ann. 78-3la-3 (1992). 
Plaintiffs contend that because the arbitration provision in the 1993 RHSM application 
is inconspicuously positioned in fine print and contained within an adhesion contract, it ought 
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not be enforced. However, the determinative issue in this case is not whether the arbitration 
provision was contained in an adhesion contract or written in fine print, but whether the 
provision itself existed and is valid. For example, if an insurance contract's language is 
uncertain, ambiguous, or otherwise invalid, it will be construed in favor of the insured. 
American Casualty Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co.. 568 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1977). 
For contract language to be considered ambiguous it must be "capable of more than 
one reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or 
other facial deficiencies'." Wiengar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
Furthermore, the court in United States Fidelity and Guarantee v. Sandt. 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 
1993), determined that a "reasonable purchaser" of insurance standard should be used in 
determining whether an insurance policy provision is ambiguous. 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 
1993). 
The arbitration provision in the 1993 RHSM group policy application was located 
directly above the line bearing plaintiff, Ann O'Connell's, signature, and states: 
I accept binding arbitration as the method of resolving any disputes arising 
between me or the covered family members and the Plan or a participating 
provider concerning the applicability of, or benefits payable under the 
Subscriber Agreement. 
The Court finds that the arbitration provision in the 1993 application was clearly 
worded, unambiguous, and not subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. The 
Court believes that a reasonable purchaser of insurance would be able to read the provision 
and easily understand that he/she was agreeing to submit any disputes to binding arbitration. 
Plaintiffs have cited several cases from other jurisdictions where arbitration provisions 
contained within adhesion contracts were found to be ambiguous and thus unenforceable. 
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See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp.. 63 CaL App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976); 
Obstetrics and Gyns. v. Pepper. 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985); and Broemer v. Abortion 
Servs. of Phoenix. 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992). Each of these cases involves a factual 
scenario where a patient was required to sign an arbitration agreement immediately prior to 
receiving medical treatment. A similar case was recently heard by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Sosa v. Paulos. 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (1996). 
In Sosa. the court refused to uphold an arbitration agreement which was signed by the 
plaintiff just one hour before she was operated on by the defendant. The plaintiff, who had 
already been undressed and was waiting in her surgical clothing, was handed three different 
forms, one of which was the agreement to submit any medical malpractice claim to 
arbitration. Id. at 26. The court found the arbitration agreement to be both procedurally and 
substantially unconscionable. 
The Court, while carefully considering the reasoning set forth in the four cases cited 
above, finds the facts of the instant case to be significantly different. The common link 
between the above cases is that they involved the signing of an agreement to arbitrate which: 
• was entered into immediately prior to receiving medical treatment, 
• provided the patient with little or no time to reflect upon the terms and conditions 
of the agreement, 
• involved plaintiffs who were in pain, or at least in a more vulnerable or susceptible 
mental state. 
In contrast, the plaintiffs in the instant case were in a much different situation. They 
were not required to sign the arbitration provision as a prerequisite to receiving immediate 
care. In fact, plaintiffs themselves initiated the change from one medical plan to another. 
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There are no exigent circumstances of any type alluded to by the plaintiffs to justify or 
explain their present reading of the application. Additionally, in the instant case the plaintiffs 
were free to take as much time as was needed to examine and Teflect upon the terms of the 
contract. The plaintiffs here were not forced to make a decision when they were in pain or a 
more vulnerable mental state commensurate with the plaintiffs in the cases cited above. 
The Court finds the plaintiffs agreed to settle their claims with BCBSU through 
binding arbitration. The Court also rules that the arbitration provisions contained in the 1993 
BCBSU application is valid and worded in a way a reasonable purchaser of insurance would 
comprehend. Furthermore, the Court also finds that no public policy grounds exist which 
would prohibit the resolution of this matter through binding arbitration. Therefore, 
defendant's motion to compel arbitration is granted. 
Counsel for the defendant is to prepare Findings and an Order consistent with, but not 
limited to, this Ruling within ten days. 
Dated this 8th day of October, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Court's Ruling, December 18, 1996. R-206 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D. OCONNELL and, 
ANN O'CONNELL, 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant. 
This case concerns the Plaintiffs right to rejoin a medical insurance group policy. This case 
is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Amend or Clarify the Court's October 8, 1996,/ruling. 
Having carefully considered the relevant facts, pleadings, and law, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion 
to Amend or Clarify and modifies its judgment accordingly. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On October 8, 1996, this Court granted the defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration in this 
case. The Court found that by signing the Rowland Hall Blue Cross application, the plaintiffs were 
bound by the arbitration clause contained within that application. On October 16, 1996, plaintifF 
moved to Amend or Clarify the Court's Ruling, asserting that plaintiffs' independent statutory right 
to appropriate medical coverage pursuant to Section 31A-22-707 is not subject to the arbitration 
clause in this case. Defendant filed a timely objection to the Motion, arguing that all the issues in this 
COURT'S RULING 
Case No. 960901038 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
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case, including the statutory rights asserted by the plaintiff, are appropriate for arbitration. Plaintiff 
did not reply and submitted the matter for decision on October 28, 1996. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Utah Arbitration Act provides: 
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the 
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the 
agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration 
accordingly, (emphasis added) 
Utah Code 78-3 la-4(l). 
The plaintiffs in this case assert that Utah Code Section 31A-22-707 requires the defendant 
to provide them with an individual insurance policy upon termination from their group policy. 
Plaintiffs argue that determining whether defendants have met this independent statutory obligation 
is not an appropriate issue for arbitration, rather it should be decided by this Court. Plaintiffs set forth 
two arguments in support of their contention: (1) they argue the language of the governing 
arbitration clause in this case does not provide for arbitration of their statutory claim, and (2) they 
contend that issues of statutory interpretation are best left to the Court and not to an arbitrator on 
public policy grounds. 
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Defendant argues that the plaintiffs statutory claim is appropriate for determination by an 
arbitrator. Defendant contends the Utah Arbitration Act gives broad authority for arbitrators to 
decide "any existing or future controversy." 
This Court notes that the arbitration clause in this case does not extend to any existing or 
future controversy, it is specifically limited to matters "concerning the applicability of, or benefits 
payable under the subscriber agreement." Despite defendant's argument that the conversion policy 
was "specifically referred to" in the subscriber agreement, the Court finds that the plaintiffs statutory 
right arises independently and is not covered by the arbitration clause. 
The Court finds the issue of whether defendant met its statutory obligation pursuant to the 
applicable sections of 31 A-22-701(-)718 can be and is severed from the other issues in this case, and 
amends its judgement accordingly. The Court finds that the language of the arbitration provision 
signed by the plaintiff does not appear to address the issue of whether defendant has provided the 
plaintiffs with a conversion policy in accordance to the statute previously mentioned. Further, even 
if the arbitration provision specifically provided for the matter of defendant's compliance with the 
statute, the Court has some reservations in leaving such issues of statutory interpretation to 
arbitration. 
In order to appropriately assess and determine whether defendant has met the obligations of 
sections 31 A-22-701(-)718, the Court orders each counsel to prepare a supplemental memoranda 
addressing the issue of whether the conversion policy issued to the plaintiff^satisfies the requirements 
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of the statute. Plaintiff has 10 days from the receipt of this order to file a memorandum. Defendant 
has an additional 10 days to respond after receipt of plaintiffs' memorandum. Plaintiff is also to 
prepare a modified Order consistent with this Ruling, and the Court's October 8, 1996, Ruling. 
Dated this 18th day of December, 1996. 
DISTRICT COURT -JUDGp,* 
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ADDENDUM C 
Court's Ruling, April 8, 1997. R-248 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD tTUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL and 
ANN 0,CONNELL/ 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 960901038 
This case is before the Court on defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider this Court's December 18, 1997, Ruling. Having carefully 
considered the applicable law, facts, and counsels1 Memoranda, the 
defendant's Motion is denied. 
Once again, the Court finds that the language of the 
arbitration provision contained in the application signed by the 
plaintiff, Ann O'Connell, does not provide for arbitration of the 
plaintiffs1 independently arising statutory rights pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 31A-22-701-718. Clearly, the Utah Arbitration Act 
authorizes this Court to examine the scope of the matters covered 
by an arbitration agreement, and to sever from arbitration any 
matters not within the scope of the agreement. See, Utah Code 
Section 78-31a-4(l). The Court also finds that the issue in the 
instant case is distinguished from those addressed in Buzas 
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Baseball v, Salt Lake Trappers. 925 P. 2d 941 (Utah 1996) (examining 
the role of the courts in reviewing arbitration awards under the 
Utah Arbitration Act), and Shearson/American Express. Inc. v. 
McMahon. 42 U.S. 220 (1987) (discussing the applicability of the 
Federal Arbitration Act) . 
Furthermore, the Court would clarify that its decision to 
sever the instant matter from arbitration does not stem from a lack 
of faith in the merits of arbitration, or any hesitancy to have an 
arbitrator hear matters involving statutory interpretation. 
Rather, the Court1s decision is based on its belief that it is not 
appropriate to arbitrate an issue concerning an independently 
arising statutory right which was not addressed by the arbitration 
provision contained within the defendant's insurance application. 
Pursuant to Section 78-31a-4(3) of the Utah Arbitration Act, 
the Court stays arbitration and orders the defendants to file an 
Answer within ten (10) days addressing those issues in the 
plaintiffs1 Complaint concerning any statutory claims they might 
have under Utah Code, Section 31A-22-70:U^SL8. 
Dated this >S ^day of April, ^199 
ilE A.' LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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